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I INTRODUCTION 
In May of this year, Kerr J, sitting in the High 
Court of New Zealand, delivered a judgment that 
for some was a disappointment, while others 
around the country breathed a sigh of relief. 
Three lesbian couples, who had been refused 
marriage licences, sought a declaration that they 
were legally able to marry under the relevant New 
Zealand legislation. Kerr J dismissed the 
application. 
The disappointment and relief at the decision 
reflected nothing more than opposing "moral 11 
ideas and values. In a case dealing with an issue 
such as this, it is easy to forget the most 
important thing, and to cloud the outcome with 
moral judgments and policy issues that are not or 
should not necessarily be the deciding factor. 
What is that most important thing? The law. This 
was simply a case asking what is the law in New 
Zealand? More specifically, it was a case of 
statutory interpretation. 
In this paper I will consider the provisions of 
the Marriage Act 1955 (the Act), as well as other 
relevant legislation. I will look at and use the 
same tools used by Kerr J to interpret the Act, 
and analyse his conclusions along the way; those 
tools being the Act itself, the common law and 
other New Zealand legislation. The main purpose 
of this paper however will be to study New 
Zealand's international human rights obligations 
and their impact on interpretation of the Act. It 
is my intention to illustrate the correct 
interpretation of the Act as allowing same-sex 
marriages. 
LAW LIBR"RY 
''i lGTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTOtl 
2 
II THE MARRIAGE ACT 1955 
The Act itself does not provide us with a 
definition of "marriage". For this reason it is 
necessary to use the techniques of statutory 
interpretation to ascertain exactly what is a 
marriage for the purposes of the Act, and 
therefore, what constitutes a legal marriage 
under the laws of New Zealand. In his judgment 
Kerr J admitted that the statute is worded in 
gender non-specific language, but seems to place 
more emphasis on the wording of the second 
schedule. 
It is clear that the Act itself prima facie does 
not rule out same-sex marriages, due to its use 
of gender neutral language such as "persons" and 
"party to [the marriage]". 1 Kerr J however found 
that specific reference to a man being prohibited 
to marry a cert a in class of woman, and vice 
versa, in the second schedule "must show 
Parliament intended that marriage meant a union 
between a woman and a man, and not between 
persons of the same sex. 112 It is respectfully 
submitted that this finding is not the logical 
conclusion one can draw from the Act. The purpose 
of the second schedule is in fact to list the 
restrictions on marriage. The list is in itself 
exhaustive as it leaves no room for adding any 
other restrictions. Not only is it a rather 
strained conclusion that by reference only to 
prohibited marriages between people of different 
sexes same-sex marriages are excluded, but if 
Parliament did wish to prohibit marriage between 
1see for example ss 15-22. 
2Quilter v Attorney-General [1996] NZFLR 481,501. 
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people of the same sex then the schedule is the 
perfect place to do it. An argument could be made 
that this interpretation creates a situation 
where if two women can marry, then two sisters 
could also marry, as they are not listed in the 
schedule. However, anomalies do occur in the law 
from time to time, and this is not enough in 
itself to point to a prohibition of same-sex 
marriages. If Parliament intended to rule out 
same-sex marriages, marriage to someone of the 
same sex as yourself would simply be added to the 
restrictions already listed. However, marriage to 
someone of the same sex is not listed in these 
second schedule restrictions, and therefore an 
argument against same-sex marriages based on this 
schedule must fail. 
Kerr J's next finding on the Act itself is that 
the marriage solemnisation wording specified in 
s31 (the "marriage vows"), also show that 
Parliament intended marriage to be only between 
people of different sexes. 3 The relevant part of 
s31 is: 
"(3) During the solemnisation of every such marriage 
each party to it shall say to the other: 
... I, A.B. take you C.D. to be my legal wife 
(or husband), or words to similar effect." 
This section neither expressly nor impliedly says 
that one party must say "I take you to be my 
wife", whilst the other party must say "I take 
you to be my husband", and therefore the use of 
the words wife and husband do not definitively 
show that the legislature intended marriage 
between different sexes only as held by Kerr J. 
3 see above n2, 501-502. 
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A simple and unstrained reading of the section 
implies that both parties could say, for example, 
"I take you to be my wife", and this would be 
perfectly legal. 
His Honour, in further analysis of this section 
said "I therefore do not find that the words "to 
similar effect" were used to permit a marriage of 
a couple of the same sex, by allowing the vow to 
be altered accordingly. 114 As already shown, 
there is no need for the vow to be altered, but 
it can in fact be changed to use words such as 
"spouse" or "partner". While this may offer only 
minimal support for an argument for same-sex 
marriages, it certainly does not suggest that 
they are excluded by the legislation. 
Kerr J was swayed by the fact that in spite of 
modern day attitudes, as he puts it, "no 
amendment has been made to the Act to 
specifically permit marriages of same-sex 
couples. 115 However, as I have shown, no 
amendment is necessary as the Act also does not 
specifically prohibit marriages of same sex 
couples. In fact, the Act does not specifically 
permit a number of things that no one would argue 
were prohibited due to this lack of specificity, 
for example, inter-racial marriages. 
Traditionally these were not commonly accepted in 
society, just like same-sex marriages, but an 
argument that inter-racial marriages are illegal 
because they are not specifically permitted by 
the Act would undoubtedly fail in these modern 
times. This is an example of how interpretation 
4Above n2, 502. 
5Above n2, 495. 
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of laws can change with changing social ideas and 
values. It would not be going too far to say that 
due to its gender non-specific language the Act 
does not specifically permit marriage between 
opposite sexes either. 
It is therefore apparent that the focus should be 
on what the Act specifically prohibits as opposed 
to what it specifically permits. Based on this 
analysis same-sex marriages are legal as they are 
not prohibited by the Act. If, however, this 
analysis is incorrect in interpreting the Act too 
widely, then at the least the Act can be said to 
be unclear and ambiguous on this issue. It 
therefore becomes necessary to look to the common 
law definition of marriage and the aids of 
statutory interpretation to give the Act a clear 
meaning. 
III THE COMMON LAW DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE 
The traditional common law view of marriage as 
quoted by Kerr J comes from Lord Penzance in the 
1866 case of Hyde v Hyde & Woodmansee: 6 
I conceive that marriage, as understood in 
Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the 
voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to 
the exclusion of all others. 
This definition is so outdated that it surely 
cannot apply to marriage in New Zealand in 1996. 
First, this was a case about polygamy, and 
therefore a strong argument can be made that the 
focus of this definition is on the "one" and not 
on the "man" and "woman". It should also be noted 
6 ( 18 6 6 ) [ 18 6 1 - 7 3 ] A 11 ER 1 7 5 , at 1 7 7 . 
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that Lord Penzance says "for this purpose". This 
gives more weight to the argument that the 
emphasis is on the "one", as this is what was 
relevant to this case, or relevant "for this 
purpose". It suggests that the judge did not 
necessarily intend for his definition to become 
the standard common law definition of marriage. 
Kerr J refers to the case of Ming Ng Ping On v 
Ming Ng Choy Fung Cam 7 where Sugarman J held 
that the references to Christianity meant merely 
a marriage in which the relationship was 
understood in Christendom, not a marriage between 
Christians only. The definition should still not 
be used in modern day New Zealand. Nothing in law 
can be judged on the basis of Christianity alone 
when New Zealand is a multi-cultural country with 
people practising a multitude of religions, and 
many who follow no religion at all. How a 
marriage lS understood in Christendom is 
irrelevant. What is important is how a marriage 
is understood in law. Ellis Jin Attorney-General 
v Family Court at Otahuhu 8 reduced Lord 
Penzance's definition to "a voluntary union, 
until death or divorce, between one man and one 
woman, to the exclusion of all others. 119 To take 
away the idea of a Christian marriage from Lord 
Penzance's definition takes away a key element of 
it and therefore makes it a different definition 
altogether. Ellis J perhaps went too far in 
trying to alter the traditional definition 
instead of coming up 
modern definition of 
7 [1964] NSWR 953 at 954, 955. 
8 [1995] NZFLR 57. 
9Above n8, 59. 
with a more appropriate and 
marriage. 
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Kerr J's reference10 to the definition of 
marriage in the case of Lindo v Belisario11 is 
even more questionable. In this case Sir William 
Scott in considering what is marriage said: 12 
It is a contract according to the law of nature, 
antecedent to civil institution, and which may take 
place to all intents and purposes, wherever two 
persons of different sexes engage, by mutual 
contracts, to live together ... where two persons agree 
to have that commerce for the procreation and 
bringing up of children, and for such lasting 
cohabitation,that, in a state of nature, would be a 
marriage, and in the absence of all civil and 
religious institutes, might safely be presumed to be, 
as it is popularly called, a marriage in the sight of 
God. 
This definition is very outdated. Two persons of 
different sexes engaging by mutual contracts to 
live together is not an appropriate definition of 
marriage; in modern times even flatmates fit into 
this part of the description. Ideas of 
procreation being tied to marriage are also no 
longer relevant 13 due to infertility, couples 
not wanting to have children and so on. 
"[L]asting cohabitation" is also not necessary 
with the high rate of divorce in modern times, 
and once again, a reference to "in the sight of 
God" is both unnecessary and inappropriate. This 
may be a way of simply referring to common law 
marriage as opposed to state licensed marriage, 
but if this is so then it still does not help us 
10Above n2, 484. 
11 (1795) 1 Hag Con 215. 
12Above nll, 230-231. 
13As recognised by Ellis J in Attorney-General v Family 
Court at otahuhu [1995] NZFLR 57. 
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as marriages must be state licensed under the 
present New Zealand law. This 
therefore does not help at all. 
definition 
Traditional common law definitions of marriage 
are therefore inapplicable to modern day marriage 
in New Zealand. One factor that they all leave 
out is the modern necessity for marriages to be 
legally recognised by the state. 14 State 
recognition is needed to distinguish marriage 
from other relationships so as to define who 
gains the benefits from marriage under the law. 
For this reason it is important to consider what 
the state recognises as being marriage, and as 
the Act itself is not clear, it is necessary now 
to consider other relevant New Zealand 
legislation. 
IV OTHER NEW ZEALAND LEGISLATION 
Kerr J accepted "that the common law may alter as 
attitudes, views and concerns of society vary and 
change and as well that it should expand to meet 
such variations and changes. 1115 However he 
placed more emphasis on what he considered to be 
amendments to other legislation that would be 
necessary if he found for the plaintiffs. At 
pages 489-490 of the judgment his Honour set out 
the various New Zealand statutes that refer to 
married couples, and at page 491 he drew 
conclusions as to how same-sex couples would fit 
into this legislation. 
14This has perhaps replaced the traditional necessity for 
marriages to be recognised by God. 
15Above n2, 489. 
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As with the vows in the Act, Kerr J concluded 
here that the references to "husband" and "wife" 
show that marriage can occur only between people 
of different sexes. However, while the statutes 
he refers to do use the terminology of husband 
and wife they do not expressly say nor imply that 
in a married couple there must be a husband and 
a wife. For example, s3 of the Family Protection 
Act speaks of "the wife or husband of the 
deceased." There is no reference made to the fact 
that the surviving spouse must be of a different 
sex to the deceased. It is not a strained 
interpretation of this legislation to say that 
the deceased could be a woman and the surviving 
spouse could also be a woman, therefore still 
being "the wife of the deceased". This is the 
case for many of the statutes relied on by Kerr 
J. 
There is little doubt that the wording of some 
legislation would better accommodate same-sex 
marriages if amended. However this is no reason 
to interpret the law as not allowing them. To 
eliminate a possible interpretation on the 
grounds that minor changes in the wording of some 
statutes may be needed to allow same-sex couples 
access to those benefits enjoyed by couples of 
the opposite sex is a weak argument. First, it 
would not be impracticable or impossible for 
Parliament to amend the statutes. Secondly, and 
more importantly, such amendment is not actually 
necessary to make same-sex marriages valid or 
legal. The fact that the couples would not enjoy 
the benefits of different-sex marriage offered by 
the legislation does not in itself prohibit their 
marriage. Instead it gives rise to discrimination 
arguments regarding the legislation. 
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The Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 
1995 (the BDMRA), refers specifically to the 
"husband and wife" as being the two parties to a 
marriage16 • Therefore a strong argument can be 
made from this that Parliament intended marriage 
to be only between a man and a woman; Kerr J 
relied heavily on this. 17 However, as argued by 
counsel for the plaintiff, the definition of 
marriage adopted by s2 of the BDMRA is that in 
the Marriage Act 1955. We can not use the BDMRA 
to interpret its "parent" Act conclusively. If 
same-sex marriages are allowed under the Marriage 
Act then they must also therefore come under the 
BDMRA. While the BDMRA may not show an intention 
by Parliament to allow same-sex marriages, it 
also does not prove an intention to exclude them. 
The next piece of New Zealand legislation which 
it is important to consider is the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990, (NZBORA) . Under sl9 of 
this Act everyone has the right to freedom from 
discrimination on the basis of sex or sexual 
orientation. Kerr J made a finding that same-sex 
couples who wish to marry are discriminated 
against . 18 He then considered s6 of the NZBORA 
which says that if legislation can be given a 
meaning that is consistent with the rights and 
freedoms contained in the NZBORA, this meaning 
shall be preferred. His Honour concluded that the 
Act cannot be given a meaning consistent with the 
16see for example s55 of the BDMRA. 
17 see above n2, 504. 
18Above n2, 504. 
This is of course only if his interpretation of the Marriage Act 
is correct and it does prohibit same-sex marriages. 
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NZBORA19 • However, as has been the focus of this 
paper so far, the Act is not as clear cut as Kerr 
J would like to believe. The Act does not 
specifically rule out same-sex marriages and 
therefore there is unquestionably scope to 
interpret it to be compatible with the right not 
to be discriminated against found in the NZBORA. 
Kerr J said that if he was wrong in respect of 
s6, then Parliament still had the right to impose 
"such reasonable 1 imitations prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society" under s5 of the NZBORA. He 
therefore concluded that Parliament "is entitled 
to reasonably limit the persons able to marry so 
that couples of the same sex are not entitled to 
go through a marriage ceremony. 1120 It is 
submitted that this is not a "reasonable" 
limitation at all. Both law and society have 
accepted homosexuality. 21 Still homosexuals 
remain a disadvantaged group in society in 
respect of some issues. With other disadvantaged 
groups, for example, racial minorities, work is 
done to give them more opportunities and to make 
them more equal. A marriage recognised by the 
state confers legal benefits on the parties to 
the marriage, and is arguably the "ideal" status 
in our society. This has the potential to 
seriously disadvantage those who under law can 
not marry, in this case, people of the same sex. 
The most commonly put forward arguments against 
19Above n2, 504. 
20Above n2, 505. 
21 see for example the Homosexual Law Reform Bill 1985 and 
the ensuing legislation. Even the fact that sexual orientation 
has been included as a prohibited ground of discrimination shows 
a modern day acceptance of homosexuality. 
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same-sex marriages rest on traditional Judeo-
Chr istian beliefs and values which are not 
universally accepted in modern day society. 
Therefore it cannot be a "reasonable" limitation, 
and should not be considered. 
Jurisprudence on the NZBORA indicates that 
legislation should be given as broad an 
interpretation as is possible in order to bring 
it in line with the NZBORA. For example, Cooke P 
in the cases of Noort v Ministry of Transport & 
Curran v Police 22 held that while the NZBORA is 
not supreme law, the Court has an obligation to 
act within the spirit of the Act, and that a 
generous interpretation of the rights and 
freedoms is required. It lS also relevant, as 
noted by Kerr J, that s5(j) of the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1924 requires a statute to be 
fairly, largely and liberally interpreted 
according to the intent of Parliament. While 
Parliament may not have intended to cover same-
sex relationships with the Marriage Act, this 
would be because it did not have them in mind. 
Therefore it follows that it can not have been 
Parliament's intention to prohibit them. Kerr J 
also refers to the ambulatory approach to 
interpretation which would enable modern 
attitudes to be taken into account. 23 His Honour 
discounts this approach because despite changing 
attitudes Parliament has not amended the Act to 
specifically permit marriages of same-sex 
couples. However, this is a matter of 
interpretation and no amendment is necessary. The 
ambulatory approach supports an interpretation 
22 ( 1992) 1 NZBORR 97. 
23Above n2, 494-495. 
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allowing same-sex marriages as modern attitudes 
are more accepting of homosexuality. Taking all 
these relevant factors into consideration it was 
possible for Kerr J to conclude that same-sex 
marriages were not excluded by the Act. 
Kerr J argued that Parliament had the chance to 
provide for same-sex marriages when the Act was 
amended in 1995, but did not do so. 24 His Honour 
related this to the question of the intent of 
Parliament. Counsel for the plaintiffs raised the 
point that Parliament simply did not think to 
make such an alteration. As Kerr J pointed out we 
do not know what Parliament was thinking, and 
therefore we also do not know that Parliament did 
not want to amend the Act in this way. It is 
submitted that Parliament also had the chance to 
amend the 
marriages, 
either. 
Act to expressly exclude same-sex 
but this amendment was not made 
The final piece of New Zealand legislation which 
is important to consider is the Family 
Proceedings Act 1980. Counsel for the plaintiffs 
raised an issue based on this Act, but Kerr J 
does not deal with it in his judgment. Much of 
the Act refers to "party /parties to the marriage" 
and is therefore gender neutral. Section 31 of 
the Act sets out the grounds on which a marriage 
can be void. The use of the word "only" prima 
facie means that s31 is an exhaustive list. There 
is nothing in this section that states that a 
marriage is void if the two parties are of the 
same sex. This is to be contrasted with the 
equivalent United Kingdom provision in the 
24Above n2, 495. 
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Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, in which sll (c) 
expressly requires the parties to be male and 
female. A marriage is void under this section 
unless the parties are "respectively male and 
female". This supports the validity of same-sex 
marriages in New Zealand as Parliament has not 
expressly or impliedly made a same-sex marriage 
void by enacting a provision similar to the 
United Kingdom one. 
Kerr J concluded his analysis of the relevant 
legislation by noting: 25 
If parliament considers marriages between same-sex 
couples should be recognised and registered as such, 
then it must enact a provision or provisions which 
makes it quite clear that is what it intends. No such 
provision or provisions have been enacted and I 
therefore conclude, that Parliament has not as yet 
decided that same-sex marriages should be permitted. 
Parliament has enacted the necessary law under 
which couples may marry. As established, this law 
is not clear. It is part of the role of the 
courts to determine the meaning of ambiguous or 
unclear legislation. Parliament has not 
specifically outlawed same-sex marriages, and 
therefore it is up to the court to look at the 
legislation which has been enacted and to 
interpret it. With respect, Kerr J appears to 
have opted for an easier route out of the issue. 
Another key tool in the interpretation of 
legislation to which the courts should have 
regard is New Zealand's international human 
rights treaty obligations. 
25Above n2, 505. 
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V INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY 
OBLIGATIONS 
Kerr J dealt with these in less than a page of 
his judgment. 26 With respect, not nearly enough 
emphasis was put on New Zealand's treaty 
obligations as statutory interpretation tools. 
New Zealand is under a legal obligation to, where 
possible, interpret its legislation so as to make 
it compatible with the rights and freedoms set 
out in these documents. The reasons for this are 
discussed later in the paper. 
There are three international human rights 
treaties to which New Zealand is a party and 
which are relevant in deciding this issue: the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, (the 
Declaration), the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 1966, (the ICCPR), and the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1966, (the CESCR). I will first set out the 
relevant provisions of and information relating 
to these documents, and then go on to explain 
their impact on the issue of same-sex marriages 
in New Zealand. 
A THE DECLARATION 
After World War II a call was made for a United 
Nations prepared International Bill of Rights. 
This led to the adoption of the Declaration by 
the United Nations General Assembly on 10 
December 1948. The relevant sections here are: 
Article 1 - All human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights ... (emphasis added). 
26 see above n2, 499. 
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Article 2(1) - Everyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status (emphasis added). 
Article 16(1) Men and women of full age, without any 
limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the 
right to marry and to found a family ... (emphasis added). 
As this was a General Assembly Resolution, 
traditionally it would not be regarded as 
binding. However, there are two schools of 
thought which suggest that the Declaration has 
acquired legal force over time by common 
acceptance. The first argues that it constitutes 
an authoritative interpretation of the provisions 
of the Charter of the United Nations, and the 
second that a number of its provisions have 
become customary international law and as such 
are binding. This second argument is known as 
the incorporation school of thought. Following 
this idea, if the Declaration is customary 
international law, it would therefore form part 
of New Zealand's domestic law, even though not 
committed to statute. 27 The International Court 
of Justice has given legal status to some General 
Assembly Resolutions, particularly those which 
are constantly repeated. 28 The Declaration 
remains an important and integral part of 
international human rights law. It is also the 
"parent" of both the ICCPR and the CESCR. 
27 see for example Triquet v Bath ( 1764) 3 BURR 1480 and 
Trendtex Trading Corp v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 1 All ER 
881, per Lord Denning at 889 . 
28see for example The South-West African Case [1966] ICJR 5, 
292. 
29 For a 
Human Rights 
Publication 
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B THE ICCPR 
This was signed by New Zealand on 12 December 
1968, and ratified on 28 December 1978. Some 
reservations were made at this time, but none 
that are relevant to this discussion. 29 The 
First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR was ratified 
in New Zealand on 28 May 1989 and came into force 
three months later, making it possible for 
individuals to take a claim against the state to 
the Human Rights Committee. The relevant sections 
of the ICCPR are: 
Article 2. 1. Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognised in the present covenant, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status. 
Article 3. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the 
enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in 
the present Covenant. 
Article 23.2. The right of men and women of marriageable 
age to marry and to found a family shall be recognised. 
Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are 
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection 
of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and 
effective protection against discrimination on any ground 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status (emphasis added). 
list of New Zealand's reservations see: 
- Status of International Instruments United 
(New York, 1987)43. 
Nations 
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This document can be argued to have strong legal 
status and to therefore be binding on the States 
Parties, particularly due to the obligations it 
contains in Article 2 for States Parties to 
implement it into domestic law. It is binding on 
the legislature so that it legislates in 
accordance with the obligations contained in the 
document. It is binding on the judiciary so that 
the obligations are considered, where helpful, in 
statutory interpretation, as is discussed in 
Parts VIII-X of this paper. Article 2.1 as well 
as being an anti-discrimination clause, is also 
an undertaking to respect and ensure the rights. 
Under Article 2.2 the legislature is required to 
adopt legislative or other measures as necessary 
to give effect to the rights. Article 2.3 
contains a very strong remedies clause, providing 
a three-pronged obligation to ensure that 
remedies for breaches of the Covenant will be 
both granted and enforced by competent 
authorities. The obligations set out in Article 
2 are extensive, and through ratification of the 
treaty they create strong legal status for the 
Covenant. 
C THE CESCR 
This covenant is different from the ICCPR in its 
legal nature. It imposes a duty on states to take 
reasonable steps to comply with the treaty. 
Article 2.1 says that a state must take steps "to 
the maximum of its available resources", and 
therefore does not impose any strong obligations 
on States Parties. However, it was signed by New 
Zealand on 12 December 1968 and ratified on 28 
December 1978 and therefore its provisions are 
still relevant when considering New Zealand's 
19 
international human rights obligations. Once 
again, certain reservations were made by the New 
Zealand government at this time, but none that 
are pertinent to the issues in this case. 30 
Article 10 says that the "widest possible 
protection and assistance" should be given to the 
family, particularly for its establishment. The 
traditional view of Mum, Dad and the kids cannot 
be the definitive family in our modern society 
with single-parenting, step-parents, homosexual 
couples raising children together, and many other 
examples of the modern family that do not fit the 
traditional mould. Marriage, though not essential 
in the definition of family, is in itself the 
establishment of a new family and is therefore 
covered by Article 10. 
VI BREACH OF THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION SECTIONS 
The discrimination sections contained in these 
documents provide a prohibition against 
discrimination on a number of stated grounds. 
Sexual orientation is not one of the listed 
grounds. However, 
that the list is 
the words "such as" suggest 
not exhaustive and that other 
grounds may be implied. As well as this, 
jurisprudence from the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee includes sexual orientation as 
a prohibited ground of discrimination. In the 
case of Toonen v Australia 31 , the Federal 
Government supported an interpretation of the 
words "other status" as including sexual 
orientation, a view supported by Sarah Joseph in 
her article "Gay Rights Under The ICCPR 
30Above n29, 13. 
31 uN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992. 
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Commentary on Toonen v Australia 1132 • She argues 
that it is easy to see sexual orientation as a 
personal characteristic and therefore a relevant 
"other status 11 • 33 The Committee however did not 
have to decide this saying instead that "[t]he 
committee confines itself to noting however that 
in its view the reference to "sex" in articles 2, 
paragraph 1, and 26 is to be taken as including 
sexual orientation. 1134 The Committee did not 
give their reasoning for this conclusion, but it 
could be based on the interpretation of the word 
"sex" to mean both gender and the practice of 
having sex, from which it would follow that "sex" 
included sexual orientation. There is a strong 
argument that sexual orientation could be 
considered to be an "other status" or that it 
could be an implied ground. However, at least for 
the purposes of the ICCPR the Human Rights 
Committee has decided that it is covered by the 
term "sex". If the Marriage Act is interpreted to 
exclude same-sex marriages then this constitutes 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation as it would dictate that homosexual 
people could not marry their partners while 
heterosexual people could. Such an interpretation 
of the Marriage Act is not consistent with the 
developing interpretation of the ICCPR. 
VII BREACH OF THE RIGHT TO MARRY 
Although she disagrees with the prospect of same-
sex marriages, Maja Eriksson starts her book The 
Right to Marry and to Found a Family - A World-
32 (1994) 13 University of Tasmania LR 392. 
33Above n32, 398. 
34Above n31, 12. 
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Wide Human Right 35 with the idea that: 36 
Marriage is still universally the most common way to 
establish a family, the basic nucleus of society's 
structure, and the right to marry is a basic human 
right recognised world - wide. 
The American Supreme Court has decided several 
cases in the last century whereby marriage has 
now achieved the status of a fundamental human 
right. To quote a few, in Maynard v Hi11 37 
marriage is described as "the most important 
relation in life", in Meyer v Nebraska 38 it is 
"essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
free men", and more recently the Court in Zabloki 
v Redhail 39 said "the right to marry is of 
fundamental importance for all individuals" 
(emphasis added). Surely it is contradictory to 
build up a strong jurisprudence stressing the 
fundamental nature of the right to marry and then 
denying it to one group in society. It is true 
that it is not a complete denial. A gay or 
lesbian person sti 11 has the right to marry 
somebody of the opposite sex. It is also true 
that Parliament is entitled to limit whom you can 
marry; very few people would argue that by law a 
man should be able to marry his sister for 
example. However, the right to marry is 
indirectly denied when people are allowed by law 
to marry only a class of people whom they would 
not want to marry. For example, a lesbian who is 
35 (Uppsala Studies in Law, no. 28, Sweden 1990). 
36Above n35, 25. 
37 125 U.S. 190 (1888) 
38 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 
39 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
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told by law that she may marry only a man will 
not want to do this, and therefore may never be 
able to marry despite the fact that she wants to 
get married and has a prospective partner 
(another woman). It is in this indirect way that 
the right to marry is breached where same-sex 
marriages are excluded. Parliament's ability to 
limit who is allowed to get married must also be 
restricted with the fundamental right to marry 
overshadowing the restrictions. Parliament has 
expressly said that a marriage between siblings 
is void. This is representative of general 
societal attitudes that incest is wrong. If a 
time ever comes when incest is acceptable then 
Parliament can lift the restriction and give 
siblings the right to marry. Parliament has not 
expressly said that same-sex marriages are void, 
and with increasing societal acceptance of 
homosexuality it is submitted that a limitation 
of this kind is not acceptable under the 
principle of the right to marry. 
Robert Cordell describes marriage as "one of the 
basic fundamental rights afforded people of ... the 
world. 1140 Marriage binds people both 
symbolically and legally41 , and leads to rights 
and benefits not available to unmarried, for 
example same-sex, couples. These benefits include 
such things as inheritance and succession rights, 
next-of-kin status and state benefits reliant on 
married status, to name but a few. 
Same-sex couples are discriminated against if 
forbidden to marry as they are unable to gain 
4011 same-Sex Marriage: The Fundamental Right of Marriage and 
an Examination of Conflict of Laws and the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause" (1994) 26 Col HR LR 247. 
41Above n37, 247. 
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access to the benefits of marriage, both social 
and legal. 
In his judgment Kerr J considered international 
treaties saying that they are 11 important 1142 , but 
placing little importance on them in the overall 
scope of his decision. His Honour found that 
these covenants, while they do protect the right 
to marry, ref er only to couples of different 
sexes, and not to same-sex couples. He based his 
conclusion on the specific wording of the ICCPR, 
that is, "the right of men and women of 
marriageable age to marry", claiming that the use 
of the words men and women indicate couples of a 
different sex. It is submitted that this is not 
the only inference that can be drawn from this 
provision. A logical interpretation is not that 
men and women have the right to marry each other, 
but rather that men have the right to marry, and 
that women have the right to marry. Therefore 
this provision does not rule out same-sex 
marriages. Kerr J limited his discussion of the 
international treaties to the right to marry, and 
did not consider issues of discrimination based 
on sexual orientation. His Honour stated that the 
international obligations do not override the 
domestic law of New Zealand. 43 Where this is 
correct the Courts are under a legal obligation 
to interpret ambiguous legislation, such as the 
Marriage Act, so that it complies with the 
treaties as will be discussed shortly. 
To interpret the Marriage Act against same-sex 
marriages is in breach of the prohibitions 
42 Above n2, 499. 
43Above n2, 499. LAW llBRARY 
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against discrimination and goes against the right 
to marry contained in these international 
treaties. So are the New Zealand Courts obliged 
to make decisions consistent with New Zealand's 
international human rights treaty obligations? 
VIII JURISPRUDENCE ON THE INFLUENCE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATIES 
There is much jurisprudence strongly supporting 
the idea that international human rights 
obligations are mandatory considerations in 
decision making, or as in this case, in 
interpretation. This is aside from any arguments 
based on obligations in the documents themselves 
to implement the treaties at a domestic level. 
There is 1 i ttle point in having international 
treaty obligations if they are not given effect 
to in domestic law. The principle of "good faith" 
must be applied here. In other words, if a state 
has signed and ratified the treaty then it must 
have intended to be bound by its provisions. It 
is assumed that the treaty was signed in good 
faith, and not just for image reasons. 44 
If a statute names a treaty or aims to implement 
one, then that statute can be interpreted using 
the treaty. Treaties can also be used to 
interpret statutes which do not implement 
them. 45 In the case of Van Gorkom v Attorney-
44This is particularly so on consideration of the 
reservations made by states on ratification of a treaty. If there 
are any provisions a state does not want to comply with this is 
stated at the time of ratification. It logically follows from 
this that any provisions which a state has not made a reservation 
about, the state must be agreeing to comply with. 
45Huscroft G and Rishworth P eds. Rights and Freedoms - The 
NZBORA 1990 and the HRA 1993 (Brookers, 1995). 
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General 46 Cooke J used both the Declaration and 
the Declaration on the 
Women 
Elimination of 
Discrimination Against to interpret 
legislation that was not specifically intended to 
implement these treaties. 
Human rights have become a legitimate concern of 
the international community. Goal 4 and Key 
Objective 1 of the Ministry of External Relations 
and Trade 1989 Corporate Plan was: 
The promotion of international human rights standards 
and their observance, and in particular gaining wider 
respect for international human rights treaties is a 
stated goal of New Zealand's foreign policy. 
Ideally, human rights are universal high moral 
standards. "Governments everywhere 
are ... sensitive to charges from the international 
community that they are violating human rights 
provisions. 1147 Different states with different 
cultures will often not agree on all rights as 
being "rights". However the universality of human 
rights is a key feature, and any state that has 
accepted an international human rights treaty has 
agreed to be bound by its provisions. In relation 
to this case, discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation is prohibited, as discussed in 
Part VI of this paper, and therefore New Zealand 
cannot plead its own or other countries' lack of 
readiness to accept this in society. 48 
4 6 [ 19 7 7 J 1 NZ LR 5 3 5 , at 5 4 3 . 
4 7 Cunningham A. S. An Analysis of New Zealand's 
Human Rights Policy, Research Paper for Degree 
Public Policy, V.U.W., 1990, 4. 
48Above n32, 407. 
International 
of Master of 
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One must question whether a relativist approach, that 
is respecting predominant cultural attitudes 
regarding 'rights' which are not universally 
accepted, is satisfactory. The result could be the 
fragmentation of the essential universality of 
fundamental human rights and freedoms. The rights of 
individuals would vary according to their location. 
Why should, for example, an Algerian homosexual have 
fewer rights than an Australian homosexual? 
Elkind and Shaw in their article The Municipal 
Enforcement of the Prohibition Against Racial 
Discrimination: A Case Study on New Zealand and 
the 1981 Springbok Tour49 look at the question 
whether an international obligation needs to be 
in the minds of the legislature before it can be 
used to interpret legislation. They claim that 
wherever possible legislation should be 
interpreted in accordance with international 
obligations, and give several examples of cases 
supporting 
should be 
the presumption that 
compatible with these 
domestic law 
international 
obligations, and will be interpreted to be so 
where there are any ambiguities or where the 
legislation is unclear. 50 In considering the 
case of Van Gorkom as previously mentioned in 
this paper it is asked II if non-binding 
declarations may so influence the courts, how 
much more persuasive is a convention which 
represents a binding legal obligation. 1151 Elkind 
and Shaw also suggest that the orthodox rule, 
49 (1984) 55 BYIL 189. 
50Above n49, 229. 
See for example Attorney-General v British Broadcasting 
Corporation [1981] AC 303, 354, [1980] 3 All ER 161, 177-8 (per 
Lord Scarman) 
Van Gorkam v Attorney-General [1977] lNZLR, 535. 
51Above n49, 231. 
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that treaty law is not part of the domestic law, 
is too broad. 52 They point to the general rule 
of international law "pacta sunt servanda", 
"pacts are binding". They also argue that for a 
treaty to be implemented into domestic law it is 
not always appropriate for an Act of parliament 
to be passed, rather for the state to adopt 
policy consistent with the treaty. 53 This is 
almost definitely the case with international 
human rights obligations. By allowing same-sex 
marriages under the existing Act this would be 
adopting policy consistent with New Zealand's 
treaty obligations as it recognises the 
prohibition on discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation and the right to marry. 
Professor Rosalyn Higgins QC, Professor of 
International Law at the University of London, 
argues that international law is not foreign law 
but part of the law of the land. 54 "[I]n today's 
world, no domestic judge can afford to be 
unfamiliar with the requirements of international 
law ... The responsibility of the state is incurred 
by acts and decisions of the judiciary ... 1155 In 
the United Kingdom it is a rule of statutory 
interpretation 
statutes to 
52 Above n49, 233-4. 
53Above n49, 235. 
where possible to construe 
make them compatible with 
5411 The Relationship Between International and Regional Human 
Rights Norms and Domestic Law" (1992) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 
1268. 
55Above n54, 1268. 
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international obligations. 56 In Attorney-General 
v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2) 57 Lord Goff found 
that the principle applies to the law in general 
and not just to statutory interpretation. The 
position in Australia is placing increasing 
importance on international obligations, which is 
summed up by Brennan Jin Mabo v Queensland: 58 
The opening up of international remedies to 
individuals pursuant to Australia's accession to the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights brings to bear on the 
common law the powerful influence of the Covenant and 
the international standards it imports. The common 
law does not necessarily conform with international 
law, but international law is a legitimate and 
important influence on the development of the common 
law, especially when international law declares the 
existence of international human rights. 
The Australian Court in the case of Minister for 
Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Teoh 59 also held 
that ratification of human rights treaties gave 
rise to a legitimate expectation that a decision 
maker would have regard to international 
covenants. 
Just because there exists the basic 
constitutional principle that the executive 
cannot change the law by entering into a treaty, 
this does not mean that failure by Parliament to 
56see for example Waddington 
R v Secretary of State for Home 
[1975] 3 All ER 497, Brind [1991] 
57 [1990] lAC 109. 
58 (1992) 107 ALR 1, at 29. 
59 (1995) 128 ALR 353. 
v Miah [1974] 1 WLR 683, 
Affairs, ex parte Phansopkar 
1 AC 696. 
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incorporate the treaty into the domestic law will 
mean courts may not have regard to the treaty. 
There are at least five ways in which a court can 
take a treaty into account: 
*as a foundation of the constitution 
*as a declaratory statement of customary 
international law which is itself part of 
the law of the land 
*as relevant to the determination of the 
common law 
* as evidence of public policy 
*as relevant to the interpretation of a 
statute60 
There are two main schools of thought relating to 
the interaction of international and domestic 
law. The first, monoism, marries the two systems 
of law together. Here international law flows 
automatically into the legal system, and it is 
automatically a source of law, (but does not oust 
existing domestic legislation). The second is 
dualism, which maintains two separate legal 
systems. Only where the domestic system has 
specifically incorporated international law can 
the domestic system have regard to that law. 
Dualism is the more traditional view, but in 
modern times it is far too narrow. It is never 
true that international law has no effect in the 
domestic legal system, as can be seen from the 
examples given above of how treaties can flow 
into the domestic law, even when unincorporated. 
There is a recent evolution in the attitude of 
courts world-wide to the reception of 
unincorporated treaties. 
60A New Zealand Guide to International Law and its Sources 
Law Commission, April 1996, 23. 
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IX THE BANGALORE PRINCIPLES 
In 1988 a conference was held at Bangalore in 
India, the result of which being a list of 
principles or guidelines for the application of 
international human rights norms into the 
domestic legal system. These principles were to 
aid states and are now frequently referred to by 
Commonwealth judges in their decisions, either 
directly, or by deciding in accordance with them. 
The main ideas to come out of these principles 
are that the domestic law, if clear, overrides 
international obligations, but, where an 
inconsistency or an ambiguity is discovered, 
steps should be taken to bring the domestic 
legislation 
obligations. 
in 
Michael Kirby 61 
line 
offers 
principles in pointing 
with 
support 
out that 
international 
for 
they 
these 
do not 
undermine state sovereignty due to the 
requirement of legislative ambiguity. He also 
argues that with ratification of the First 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, and therefore 
opening oneself up to international scrutiny and 
criticism, if domestic law is found not to be in 
line with international human rights obligations, 
a state must bring its law into conformity or be 
"revealed as a mere participant in human rights 
'window-dressing' . 1162 
The Bangalore Principles are not alarming. They 
are the same sorts of principles that exist in 
61 Kirby M "The Impact of International Human Rights Norms 
A Law Undergoing Evolution" (1995) 25 WALR 30, 43. 
62Above n61, 43. 
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the majority of legal systems in some form or 
other. They are accepted as an "orthodox 
statement of applicable principles for dealing 
with gaps in the common law and ambiguities of 
legislation to which universal human rights 
jurisprudence might lend an aid. 1163 In this case 
we have ambiguity in a piece of legislation. 
Therefore in applying the Bangalore Principles 
the New Zealand courts should be bringing the 
legislation in line with our international 
obligations and allow same-sex marriages. 
X JUDICIAL RECEPTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY 
OBLIGATIONS IN NEW ZEALAND 
New Zealand, 
Australia, lS 
like the United 
developing a 
Kingdom and 
jurisprudence 
recognising the importance of international human 
rights norms. Based on recent case law it is 
evident that international human rights standards 
are a "significant component in the overall 
development of New Zealand's jurisprudence and 
policy. 11 64 
The Court of Appeal in the 1981 case of Ashby v 
Minister of Immigration 65 was reluctant to take 
the step towards accepting international 
obligations. This was a case seeking judicial 
review of the Minister's decision to grant entry 
permits to the South African rugby team. On 
appeal references were made to New Zealand's 
obligations under the Uni ted Nations Convention 
Against Racial Discrimination. It was argued that 
63Above n61, 45 . 
64Above n4 5 , 63 . 
6 5 [ 19 8 1 ] 1 NZ LR 2 2 2 . 
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the Minister's statutory discretion should be 
exercised consistently with New Zealand's 
international obligations, and if the discretion 
was so exercised, the permits ought not to have 
been granted. The Court, including Cooke J, held 
that in some circumstances Ministers exercising 
statutory discretion are entitled, but not bound 
to take into account relevant international 
treaty obligations. This was the leading case in 
this area for over ten years. 
By 1992, Cooke was now President of the Court of 
Appeal and showing a shift in attitude, saying in 
the case of Ministry of Transport v Noort: 66 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights speaks of inalienable rights derived from the 
inherent dignity of the human person. Internationally 
there is now general recognition that some human 
rights are fundamental and anterior to any municipal 
law, although municipal law may fall short of giving 
effect to them ... 
A key case in this area is Tavita v Minister of 
Immigration 67 . In this case it was argued that 
the Minister of Immigration, in deciding to 
deport a Western Samoan citizen overstayer with 
a New Zealand born child, did not take into 
account the ICCPR or the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Crown 
based their defence on Ashby saying that the 
Minister was entitled to ignore international 
treaty obligations, but this was rejected by the 
Court of Appeal, led by Cooke P. The Court 
acknowledged the unfortunate situation that could 
66 [ 1992] 3 NZLR 260, at 270. 
67 [1994] 2 NZLR 257. 
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arise if a New Zealand Court found that a piece 
of legislation was valid, and the Human Rights 
Committee found it to be in violation of our 
obligations. 68 
Cooke P, from being very dualistic in Ashby, in 
this case takes a much more rights-centred 
approach. In finding human rights treaties to be 
mandatory relevant considerations, he is saying 
that failure to pay regard to them is an error of 
law. This is a definite sign of strong 
receptiveness to human rights obligations. It is 
a Court of high authority giving them important 
status. 
Acceptance of international obligations can also 
be found in Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent's 
CaseJ 69 , where it was found that even an 
unincorporated treaty may be used to interpret 
legislation. In Nikoo v Removal Review 
Authori ty70 McGechan J in the High Court 
expressly followed Tavita, and said that where 
possible legislation should be construed so as to 
recognise international obligations. 71 In the 
very recent case of Puli'uvea v The Removal 
Review Authority72 the Court of Appeal, now led 
by Richardson P, also followed Tavita in 
substance by showing the continued importance of 
having regard to treaty obligations. 
68This could occur if an individual took a claim to the 
Committee under the First Optional Protocol. 
69 [1994] 3 NZLR 667. 
70 [1994] NZAR 509. 
71Above n70, 518. 
7 2 ( 19 9 6 ) 14 FRN Z 3 2 2 . 
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As Cooke P says in Tavita, "[t]he law as to the 
bearing on 
rights and 
undergoing 
domestic law of international human 
instruments declaring them is 
evolution. 1173 The evolution in New 
Zealand, as elsewhere in the world, has followed 
a steady path towards the acceptance of 
international human rights treaty obligations as 
becoming more and more legally binding. For 
reasons previously discussed, it is the opinion 
of this author that they are already legally 
binding obligations. 
XI CONCLUSION 
The Marriage Act is unclear on the issue of same-
sex marriages. While it does not expressly 
provide for them, it does not exclude them 
either. In interpreting this legislation I have 
looked at several different interpretative tools 
and have not found one that would conclusively 
suggest that the Act should be read so as to 
prohibit same-sex marriages. 
New Zealand is not the only jurisdiction that has 
been asked in recent times to consider the 
validity of same-sex marriages. In April of this 
year the Dutch Parliament voted 81 to 60 in 
favour of allowing same-sex marriages, with a 
view to having legislation drafted by August next 
year enabling gay and lesbian couples to 
marry. 74 The decision of the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii in Baehr & Ors v Lewin75 is leading the 
way for the recognition of same-sex marriages in 
73 Above n67, 40. 
74ANP English News Bulletin, April 18 1996, 3. 
75 (1993) 74 Haw 539. 
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Hawaii, with a final decision due in the near 
future. Therefore, other jurisdictions are paving 
the way towards legal recognition of same-sex 
marriages. 
The issue of international human rights has 
become very important in the twentieth century. 
Jurisprudence in this area shows that traditional 
ideas of absolute state sovereignty are being 
relaxed to allow the influence of international 
human rights norms into the domestic legal 
sphere. This is particularly so in the area of 
interpretation of legislation. The judiciary in 
New Zealand has developed a willingness to accept 
these treaty obligations. An interpretation of 
the Act as prohibiting same-sex marriages is a 
breach of New Zealand's international human 
rights obligations as it constitutes a breach of 
the right to marry, and a breach of the right not 
to be discriminated against on the grounds of 
sexual orientation, as described in the 
international documents to which New Zealand is 
a party. 
With respect to Kerr J, it is submitted that, for 
these reasons, the correct interpretation of the 
Marriage Act is that it does not prohibit same-
sex marriages, and therefore a marriage between 
t wo persons of the same sex in New Zealand is 
legal and valid. 
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